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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fire moved quickly through the house as Cameron Todd Willingham screamed 
for his children from the front porch.1 Inside the blaze were his three children.2 Firefighters 
arrived, uncoiled hoses, and aimed water at the raging fire.3 However, all three Willingham 
children died that night from smoke inhalation.4 
News of the December 23, 1991, tragedy spread throughout Corsicana, Texas.5 
Meanwhile, investigators sought to determine what caused the fire.6 The investigators 
“toured the perimeter of the house, taking notes and photographs, like archeologists 
mapping out a ruin.”7 In the kitchen, they found smoke and heat damage—signs the fire 
had not originated there—so they proceeded to other parts of the shambled home.* 
As the investigators continued through the home, they noticed charring along the 
base of the walls and burn patterns shaped like puddles on the floor.8 The investigator knew 
a “combustible liquid doused on the floor will cause a fire to concentrate in these kinds of 
pockets, which is why investigators refer to them as ‘pour patterns’ or ‘puddle 
configurations.’”9 The investigators further examined glass from one of the broken 
windows.10 The glass was “crazed,” which has long been described as an indicator the fire 
burned “fast and hot,” meaning an accelerant was used in the fire.11 The investigators 
ultimately identified three locations of origin and concluded the fire was intentionally set.12 
The investigators had a clear vision of what happened.13 
On the night of January 8, 1992, Willingham was arrested and charged for the 
murders of his three children.14 In August 1992, Willingham’s trial commenced and 
 
 1  David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [hereinafter Trial by Fire].  
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id. 
 *  Id. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. Multiple points of origin was generally thought to indicate that a fire was intentionally started, or at 
least speaks to the lower probability that the fire was accidental. Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
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included the expert testimony of an arson investigator.15 At the conclusion of the trial, the 
jury deliberated for barely an hour before returning with a unanimous guilty verdict.16 As 
the fire investigator had put it, “[t]he fire does not lie.”17 
Despite a jury’s findings, flawed fire techniques taint investigations, leading to the 
misinterpretation of evidence as indicative of arson. Some courts grapple with the issue of 
applicable standards in fire investigations and seek to “weed out” questionable science and 
techniques.18 However, others continue to ignore the relevant standards and scientific 
method by admitting the flawed testimony of fire investigators in arson cases.19 
For instance, West Virginia courts have failed to recognize the National Fire 
Protection Association’s (“NFPA”) guideline 921—a standard requiring the application of 
the scientific method to fire investigation and debunking many flawed techniques—and 
employ the Daubert factors to determine whether expert testimony in arson cases is 
admissible.20 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s argument—that it will not 
follow NFPA 921 until the legislature enacts a law recognizing the guidelines—is nothing 
more than smoke and mirrors.21  Although NFPA 921 guidelines are classified as “marginal 
changes,” the guidelines are making actual leaps to overcome the hurdles in innocence 
claims involving arson.22 To correct these pitfalls, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia—not the legislature—should adopt NFPA 921 as the standard of care, even in the 
absence of the legislature’s failure to “codify science.”  Doing so will provide a foundation 
for the progress and reliability of fire science in West Virginia. 
Part II of this article examines the evolution of the legal standards pertaining to the 
admission of scientific expert testimony from the adoption of the Frye general acceptance 
test, to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the federal abrogation of Frye 
through Daubert. Part II also considers how the Rules of Evidence concerning scientific 
expert testimony changed on the state level in West Virginia and the interplay of such 
expert testimony with arson investigations. Part III of this article argues the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of West Virginia has turned a blind eye to the evolving standards of expert 
testimony by concluding that NFPA 921 is a mere guideline unrecognized by the legislature 
and a standard that only provides marginal changes and not new evidence for innocence 
claims. Finally, Part IV concludes by reiterating the pitfalls of fire science in the courtroom 
and the call for reform. 
 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  See generally John J. Lentini, The Standard of Care in Fire Investigation, SCI. FIRE ANALYSIS (2007), 
http://www.firescientist.com/Documents/The%20Standard%20of%20CareCAFI%202007.pdf. 
 19  See infra Section II.C. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  See infra Section III.C. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Part II of this article explores the relevant rules concerning expert testimony as 
they changed over time and discusses the implementation of those rules in West Virginia. 
Section II.A establishes a timeline detailing the changes of expert scientific testimony on 
both a federal and state specific level. Section II.B explores the field of fire science and 
relevant methods, techniques, and tools used in fire investigation. Finally, Section II.C 
introduces the case in West Virginia in which the relevant fire science is overlooked. 
A. Admitting Expert Evidence 
This Section explores the evolving standards and rules—on both the federal and 
state level—concerning scientific expert testimony. More specifically, this Section 
examines the changes under the rules of evidence as they apply to scientific expert 
testimony. 
1. The Evolving Standard: Frye, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Daubert 
Scientific expert testimony has a long history in common law courts.23 The 
common law has long recognized the “importance of scientific advice in cases where the 
disputed facts were such that the courts lacked sufficient knowledge to draw from them an 
informed decision.”24 In 1922, James Frye was accused of murder.25 Frye pleaded not 
guilty and, in his defense, offered William Marston, one of the inventors of the lie detector, 
as an expert witness.26 Marston intended to testify about the results allegedly proving 
Frye’s truthfulness.27 The trial court refused to allow the testimony because polygraphs 
were inadmissible until “there is an infallible instrument for ascertaining whether a person 
is speaking the truth or not.”28 
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the trial court’s 
exclusion of the polygraph.29 The appellate court put forward what is now recognized as 
the “general acceptance test.”30 By the 1970s, Frye’s general acceptance test “had become 
 
 23  Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 881 (2008). 
 24  Id.  
 25  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 26  Id.  
 27  Golan, supra note 23, at 927; see also Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14. The polygraph test used in Frye’s case 
is “described as the systolic blood pressure deception test. It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by 
change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous 
impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system.” Id. at 1013. The polygraph here, 
which essentially relied on a blood pressure cuff, has drastically changed today in its modern use. 
 28  Golan, supra note 23, at 927 (internal quotations omitted).  
 29  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.   
 30  Id. at 1014.  
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‘not only the majority view, [but] the almost universal view’ in the majority of criminal 
courts that considered the admissibility of new scientific evidence.”31 
Nevertheless, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were codified and included 
rules on expert testimony.32 The new rules made no mention of Frye’s general acceptance 
test, nor did the rules articulate any special test for ensuring the reliability of scientific 
evidence.33 Instead, Rule 702 casted “the widest net possible,” providing “[i]f scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or 
otherwise.”34 
Before the current codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the case of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.35 brought another refinement.36 In Daubert, 
the plaintiffs were born with serious birth defects and blamed Merrell Dow’s Bendectin—
a popular anti-nausea drug mothers took during pregnancies.37 The plaintiffs offered 
experts who concluded that the drug caused birth defects.38 The plaintiffs argued the 
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye and, under those rules, the jury—not the 
judge—determines the persuasiveness of the scientific evidence introduced.39 The 
Supreme Court agreed that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.40 However, the 
Court also ruled that judges are the gatekeepers of such testimony and laid out several 
factors to be considered in determining whether to admit scientific expert testimony.41 The 
factors include “testability,” whether the science is subject to “peer review,” the known 
potential “rate of error,” the existence and maintenance of “controlling standards,” and the 
 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, 
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made 
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs. 
 Id.  
 31  Golan, supra note 23, at 931 (citation omitted).  
 32  Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, A SIMPLIFIED GUIDE TO FORENSIC ADMISSIBILITY AND EXPERT 
WITNESSES, http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/legal/702.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter 
A Simplified Guide to Rule 702].  
 33  Golan, supra note 23, at 932. 
 34  Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).  
 35  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 36  Golan, supra note 23, at 933–34.   
 37  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582. 
 38  Id. at 583.  
 39  Id. at 587, 596–97. 
 40  Id. at 587.   
 41  Id. at 592–94. 
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question of whether the science is “generally accepted” within the relevant scientific 
community.42 
One question left open by Daubert was whether this standard applied to expert 
testimony not scientific in nature. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,43 the Court extended 
the rule in Daubert to apply to all experts.44 While most states adopted either the Federal 
Rules of Evidence or Frye, states retained the ability to adopt their own rules of evidence.45 
As such, not all states adopted the Daubert standards or its extension to all experts as 
prescribed in Kumho.46 
The current version of Rule 702, however, provides lower standards than Daubert 
and allows for an expert qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
to testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the 
expert has reliably applied the principle and methods to the facts of the 
case.47 
In addition to Rule 702, Federal Rule 703 addresses the concerns of expert opinion 
testimony by permitting it “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on 
those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject . . . .”48 
2. Daubert in West Virginia: Wilt v. Buracker 
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia took issue with whether 
Daubert should be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under West 
 
 42  Id. 
 43  526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 44  Id. at 150. For a more comprehensive understanding of this issue, see the so-called “Daubert Trilogy:” 
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993). 
 45  A Simplified Guide to Rule 702, supra note 32.  
 46  Id. 
 47  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 48  FED. R. EVID. 703. 
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Virginia Rules of Evidence 702.49 In Wilt v. Buracker,50 Wilt and his wife sought civil 
compensation for injuries sustained from a car accident.51 The defendant was killed in the 
collision, and the Wilts brought the action against his estate.52 
The plaintiffs sought to introduce several experts at trial. One expert was an 
economist whose testimony included the calculation of damages for loss of enjoyment of 
life.53 Before embarking on the issue concerning the admissibility of the economist’s 
testimony, the court concluded the Daubert analysis applies to West Virginia Rule of 
Evidence 702.54 Subsequently, the court decided the expert’s testimony was inadmissible 
because it lacked relevance to a calculation of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life.55 
Nevertheless, West Virginia adopted Daubert through Wilt. However, the Wilt 
decision begs the question—much like Daubert—does the application of the rule 
established in Wilt also extend to non-scientific experts? 
3. Kumho in West Virginia: Watson v. Inco Alloys International, Inc. 
Two years after Kumho, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed 
the Wilt’s unanswered question. In Watson v. INCO Alloys International, Inc.,56 the 
decedent, Mr. Watson, was operating a stand-up lift for his employer.57 While loading 
materials onto a tractor trailer, the lift backed off the side of the tractor trailer, fell 
approximately five feet, landed on the floor, and crushed Mr. Watson, who died as a 
result.58 
 
 49  W. VA. R. EVID. 702. 
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. (b) In addition to the requirements in subsection (a), expert testimony 
based on a novel scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only 
if: (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of 
reliable principles and methods; and (3) the expert has reliably applied the principles and 
methods to the facts of the case. 
 Id. 
 50  443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993). 
 51  Id. at 199. 
 52  Id.  
 53  Id. at 200. 
 54  Id. at 203 (concluding that “Daubert’s analysis of Federal Rule 702 should be followed in analyzing the 
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence”). 
 55  Id. at 203–04; see also Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995) (explaining further the 
application of the court’s gatekeeper function as established in Wilt). 
 56  545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001). 
 57  Id. at 297. 
 58  Id. 
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The plaintiff, decedent’s wife, brought an action alleging that the lift was defective, 
was not equipped with side doors, and failed to provide appropriate warnings.59 The 
plaintiff proffered the expert testimony of a licensed engineer.60 The lower court excluded 
the expert’s testimony on the basis that the proposed testimony concerning the “causation 
and enhancement” of Mr. Watson’s injuries was outside his expertise.61 The lower court 
reasoned that “the issues of design defects . . . and lack of adequate warnings” were 
scientific in nature; thus, the expert “must fulfill the standards set forth in [Wilt/Daubert],” 
and the expert here did not.62 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia framed the issue as 
“whether Mrs. Watson’s expert witness . . . should be permitted to testify regarding alleged 
design defects  . . . [including] the lack of adequate warnings.”63 After noting that “[u]nless 
an engineer’s opinion is derived from the methods and procedures of science, his or her 
testimony is generally considered technical in nature, and not scientific,”64 the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded the lower court erred in excluding the 
expert’s testimony.65 Thus, West Virginia declined to extend Wilt/Daubert in its 
application to non-scientific experts. 
B. Arson Investigation and the Scientific Method 
This Section explores changing standards of care, flawed techniques, and the use 
of the scientific method in fire investigation. More specifically, this Section provides a 
basis for understanding NFPA 921 and its evolution as applied to fire investigations and 
specific flawed techniques used by fire investigators. 
1. Establishing NFPA 921 
In 1992, the NFPA released its first edition of NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and 
Explosion Investigation.66 NFPA 921 assists fire investigators throughout the United States 
in the investigation of fire incidents and “aid[s] in drawing conclusions and rendering 
 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 238. 
 64  Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.  
 65  Id. at 299. 
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opinions” concerning the origins and cause.67 NFPA 921 also provides “recommendations” 
for the methodical investigation and analysis of fire incidents.68 To further aid 
investigators, NFPA 921 included “specific procedures” concerning the collection and 
analysis of evidence.69 
When NFPA 921 was first introduced, many fire investigators countered its 
scientific methods with a “culture that believed fire investigation was more art than 
science.”70 For instance, in Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janelle R. Benfield,71 
the International Association of Arson Investigators (“IAAI”) filed an amicus curiae brief, 
claiming the standard in Daubert should not be applied to fire investigation expert 
testimony “because fire investigation is ‘less scientific.’”72 
The IAAI endorsed NFPA 921 in 2013.73 In so doing, the IAAI stated NFPA 921 
“‘is widely recognized as an authoritative guide for the fire investigation profession’ . . . . 
NFPA 921 is ‘an important reference manual and sets forth guidance and methodology 
regarding the determination of origin and cause of fires.’”74 Still, the IAAI has stopped 
short of identifying NFPA 921 as a “standard of care” and instead is an “offering 
guidance.”75 
2. Pre-NFPA 921 Techniques and the Scientific Method 
For years after its introduction, NFPA 921 remained a controversial document and 
was challenged by individuals who believed NFPA 921 “took away their tools.”76 NFPA 
921 dealt with misconceptions in the fire investigation community.77 Nearly all of the 
misconceptions were related to post-fire artifacts, including “crazed glass, melted bed 
 
 67  Parisa Deghani-Taft & Paul Bieber, Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson Investigation and 
Innocence Claims, 119 W. Va. L. Rev. 549, 553–54 (2016) [hereinafter Folklore and Forensics].   
 68  Id. at 554.  
 69  Id. 
 70  Id.  
 71  140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 72  Forensics and Folklore, supra note 67, at 555.  
 73  Id. at 556. 
 74  Id. (citation omitted).  
 75  Id. In his article, Paul Bieber highlights the problem of continuing to refer to NFPA as simply a guide 
that can be followed or ignored at the discretion of the fire investigator, because it begs the question of “what 
standards actually exist within the field of fire investigation to control or limit the methodologies, processes, 
or techniques used in forming expert conclusions regarding origin or cause of a fire?” Id. at 556–57.  
 76  Lentini, supra note 18. 
 77  Id.  
9
Maidona: The "Damned" in a Flashover State: Arson and the Use of Scientifi
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020
10 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 121 
springs, and spalled concrete, as evidence of arson.”78 These misconceptions made it 
difficult to identify the origin of the fire.79 
Most notably, NFPA 921 was not “the debunking of the mythology of arson 
investigation; it was the statement that fire investigation should be conducted according to 
the scientific method.”80 The scientific method was resisted for a number of years by 
investigation professionals who argued that fire investigation was “less scientific” than 
other kinds of forensic investigations.81 Still, NFPA’s call for conducting fire investigations 
according to the scientific method is recognized in several cases throughout the United 
States.82 
On a forensic fire scene, the most important determination is the fire’s area of 
origin.83 Once the origin of the fire is identified, fire investigators can then examine a scene 
to determine the cause of the fire.84 In determining origin, fire investigators examine and 
interpret “shape, depth, texture, location, and overall appearance of the effects and patterns 
made by the heat of the fire on walls, ceilings, floors, or furniture.”85 NFPA 921 explains 
fire behavior and “lists various common fire patterns and effects created in normal room 
fires, including ‘V-patterns,’ depth of char, lines of demarcation, soot and smoke 
deposits.86 
However, a factor complicating the determination of origin is the effect of 
flashover.87 Flashover is a “transient phase in an enclosed room fire where the temperature 
rises so high throughout the room that combustible items begin to burn, even at floor level 
and in areas away from the fire’s origin.”88 As a fire approaches flashover, a smoke layer 
forms along the ceiling and radiates heat downward towards the floor.89 At this point, any 
combustibles in the room will ignite almost simultaneously.90 
Flashover quickly transitions to “full room involvement.”91 At this stage, 
ventilation-generated fire patterns create conflicting burn damage and fire patterns 
 
 78  Id. 
 79  See generally Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 558.  
 80  Lentini, supra note 19. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 558. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 559. 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. 
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throughout the room, distorting the true area of origin.92 Thus, even experienced 
investigators can easily misidentify the origin where indicating patterns may or may not 
persist through flashover and full room involvement.93 
Another technique used in identifying origin is arc mapping.94 NFPA 921 describes 
arc mapping as a “technique in which the investigator uses the identification of arc 
locations . . . to aid in determining the area of fire origin.”95 Arc mapping interprets the 
“spatial relationship” of artifacts on energized electrical conductors damaged by heat 
during the course of a fire.96 
Unfortunately, there is no published research measuring the accuracy or error rate 
of any of these principles, let alone an investigator’s ability to synthesize these factors in 
determining where a fire started.97 NFPA 921 does not describe arc mapping as a 
standalone methodology to determine origin, but instead opines that arc mapping “can be 
used in combination with other data to more clearly define the area of origin.”98 
In the most recent version of NFPA 921, the process of “negative corpus” is 
described as “[i]dentifying the ignition source for a fire by believing to have eliminated all 
ignition sources found, known, or suspected to have been present in the area of origin, and 
for which no supporting evidence exists.”99 The current version of NFPA 921 also states 
that this “process is not consistent with the [S]cientific [M]ethod, is inappropriate, and 
should not be used because it generates untestable hypotheses, and may result in incorrect 
determinations of the ignition source . . . .”100 However, the 1992 version of NFPA 921 
omits this entirely.101 
Finally, the means by which investigators utilize witness statements and how those 
statements influence investigators’ final conclusions remains controversial in the fire 
investigation community.102 NFPA 921 recognizes the use of witness information as a 
legitimate source of data analyzable in fire investigations but provides conflicting guidance 
on how a witness statement should be used by a fire investigator in forming an expert 
conclusion on the origin.103 
 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 560. 
 95  NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 211.  
 96  Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 560. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. (citations omitted).   
 99  NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 221 (2017).   
 100  Id.  
 101  NFPA 921, supra note 66 (1992).  
 102  Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 560. 
 103  Id. at 560–61. 
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NFPA 921 cautions: “[w]itness statements regarding the location of the origin 
create a need for the fire investigator to conduct as thorough an investigation as possible to 
collect data that can support or refute the witness statements.”104 NFPA 921 further 
explains “[w]itness statements are not supported by the investigator’s interpretation of the 
physical evidence, [and]  the investigator should evaluate each separately.”105 The question 
of how NFPA 921 “squares the imperfect and often unverifiable nature of a witness 
statement with its general reliance on empirical data remains unclear.”106 
C. West Virginia’s (In)Application of NFPA 921 in Anstey v. Ballard 
This Section illustrates the issues of failing to apply NFPA 921 as the standard of 
care in West Virginia by providing examples at both the trial and appellate level. 
Furthermore, this Section sets the background for further exploration of the need to adopt 
NFPA 921 as the standard of care in West Virginia. 
1. Anstey on Trial 
On February 8, 1994, a fire erupted in Harvey Hill, West Virginia, in the home of 
Samuel Anstey and his grandmother, Marie Donollo.107 Mr. Anstey was awakened by 
debris and the sound of his screaming grandmother. When Anstey opened his door, he felt 
intense heat and was confronted by a hallway filled with smoke.108 Unable to reach his 
grandmother, Anstey escaped through a window to find help.109 Anstey drove to three 
different neighbors; the closest neighbor called 911.110 
When asked why he did not stop at the closest neighbor’s home first, Anstey 
responded the “truck had a full tank of gas,” and “he was concerned the fire might cause 
the truck to explode given its proximity to the trailer.”111 The Oak Hill Volunteer Fire 
Department arrived on scene 12 minutes after receiving the 911 call.112 Anstey informed 
first responders his grandmother was still inside.113 Upon entering, firefighters discovered 
Anstey’s grandmother unconscious and removed her from the building.114 Ms. Donollo 
was transported to the hospital and treated for her injuries, but she died on February 12, 
 
 104  NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 207; see also Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 561. 
 105  NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 207; see also Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 561. 
 106  Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67 at 561. 
 107  Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 868 (W. Va. 2016). 
 108  Id. at 868–69.   
 109  Id. at 869. 
 110  Id.  
 111  Id.  
 112  Id.  
 113  Id.  
 114  Id.  
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1994.115 On May 11, 1994, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the petitioner 
with first-degree murder116 and first-degree arson.117 The State proceeded to trial solely on 
the murder charge under the theory of felony-murder.118 
At trial, the State called several experts, including Roger York, the Assistant State 
Fire Marshal; Steven Cruikshank, the Director of Emergency Services and Fire 
Coordinator for Fayette County; and Harold Franck, an expert in electrical and forensic 
engineering and fire determination.119 Each expert offered testimony regarding the fire’s 
cause and origin based on their respective examinations of the trailer and its contents.120 
The State also put on testimony by Lieutenant Robert Begley of the Volunteer Fire 
Department’s Investigation Unit.121 Begley worked at a funeral home and was also a 
volunteer firefighter.122 He completed a two-week, 80-hour training from the National Fire 
Academy on fire investigation techniques in addition to other arson determination 
classes.123 During his investigations on February 8, 1994, he observed the “fire damage 
was in the living room and kitchen areas of the trailer and, principally, in the kitchen ‘from 
the counter top up.’”124 Furthering his suspicion, Begley did not observe any heat or smoke 
damage in Anstey’s room because there was a towel and weather-stripping surrounding the 
door.125 
However, Begley observed “a lot of fire damage directly underneath the toaster” 
located on the kitchen counter with two sheets of aluminum foil placed on top.126 Begley 
conceded to moving the toaster before photographing it and also tampering with the pull-
down mechanism during his investigation.127 He moved the plunger to see if it was down 
and then put it back to its “original position.”128 
 
 115  Id. “According to the State medical examiner, the cause of death was ‘smoke and soot inhalation 
resulting in a brain-dead condition.’” Id. 
 116  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (West 2018).  
 117  Id. at § 61-3-1; see also Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 866.   
 118  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 866; see also Felony Murder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Murder 
that occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony (often limited to rape, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, 
and arson).).” 
 119  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 870. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. at 869–70. 
 122  Transcript of Trial at 1135, State v. Samuel R. Anstey, Indictment No. 94-F-31 (Sept. 8, 1995). 
 123  Id. 
 124  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 869–70. 
 125  Id.  
 126  Id.  
 127  Id.  
 128  Transcript of Trial at 1106, State v. Samuel R. Anstey, Indictment No. 94-F-31 (Sept. 8, 1995). 
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Begley further testified checking the breaker box and noticed breakers three, four, 
and five tripped.129 Begley checked to confirm the breakers were tripped by moving them 
to the off position.130 He also determined the smoke detectors in the trailer were hardwired 
to the breaker and, as a result, were not set off during the fire.131 Despite being trained not 
to disrupt the scene, Begley turned the tripped breakers back to the on position and then 
back to the off position.132 Begley then waited for Assistant State Fire Marshal Roger York 
to arrive.133 
York134 investigated the scene and testified the origin of the fire was the toaster. 
York called Cruikshank to the scene to observe some “suspicious” or “questionable” 
things.135 He questioned the fire department’s activities before his arrival and discovered 
two points of origin, indicating that the fire was intentionally caused.136 At this point, the 
State’s experts also alleged Anstey had disarmed the smoke detectors by flipping its 
electrical breaker.137 
During the State’s closing, the prosecutor highlighted details relating to the large 
estate Anstey was to inherit upon his grandmother’s death and his alleged abusive 
behavior.138 On September 8, 1995, the jury found the petitioner guilty of first-degree 
murder and recommended life without parole.139 
2. Anstey on Appeal 
On May 12, 2014, Anstey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting a 
new trial or, in the alternative, an omnibus habeas corpus hearing.140 Anstey asserted that 
the “advancement of fire science and arson investigation since his 1995 conviction 
 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. at 1098. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. at 1099. 
 133  Id. at 1107. 
 134  York was an Assistant State Fire Marshal and had worked in that office since 1989. Id. at 1211.  He 
enforced the state fire laws and investigated the cause and origin of fires. Id. He had been in the fire department 
20 years and listed a long resume of cause and origin related classes, seminars, certifications. Id. at 1212.  He 
testified in arson cases for the state on four or five separate occasions. Id. at 1214.  He also obtained his 
bachelor’s degree from Glenville State College and was involved in excess of 500 arson investigations. Id. 
York was admitted as an expert at trial. Id. at 1215. 
 135  Id. at 1242. 
 136  Id. The state’s expert testified that the fire had been intentionally set with two points of origin: a rigged 
toaster in the kitchen and a covered heating vent in Ms. Donollo’s bedroom. Id. 
 137  Id. at 1448–51. 
 138  Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 867–69 (W. Va. 2016).  
 139  Id. at 873. 
 140  Id.  
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constituted newly discovered evidence and demonstrates that his trial was fundamentally 
unfair in violation of his right to due process of law.”141 Anstey also asserted, “prior to 
2000, the scientific method which forms the basis of NFPA 921 was not widely accepted 
and was disregarded by the State’s witnesses in investigating the trailer fire.”142 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia disagreed with Anstey’s 
assertions for three reasons. First, the court took issue with Anstey’s failure to cite any 
controlling authority.143 In other words, Anstey failed to establish that NFPA 921 was 
generally accepted as authoritative in West Virginia.144 The court went on to state that 
[it] cannot find, nor do the parties cite, any statute or regulation where the 
State Fire Commission has expressly adopted NFPA 921 as . . . [a] 
standard to be followed in fire investigations in this state. In fact, the 
statute pertaining to the State Fire Marshal’s fire investigations does not 
mention NFPA 921.145 
Because of this lack of authority, the court held Anstey “was not denied his right to a fair 
trial and due process of law through the admission of the testimony of the State’s 
experts.”146 The court further stated, “[e]ven today, the admissibility of the State’s expert 
testimony would be assessed under Rule 702147 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence as 
evidence based on technical or specialized knowledge—and not under Daubert/Wilt,”148 
and, thus, his due process was not violated.149 
Second, the court pointed out that Anstey did not cite any authority requiring “the 
State’s cause and origin investigation ha[s] to follow the method outlined in . . . NFPA 
 
 141  Id. at 873–74. 
 142  Id. at 874. 
 143  Id. at 875. 
 144  Id. at 876. 
 145  Id. (citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-3-12(f) (West 2018)). 
 146  Id. at 881. 
 147  W. VA. R. EVID. 702. 
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise. 
(b) In addition to the requirements in subsection (a), expert testimony based on a novel 
scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only if: 
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(3) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
 Id. 
 148  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 881. 
 149  Id. 
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921.”150 The court further reasoned that “even after the U.S. Department of Justice 
described NFPA 921 as having ‘become a benchmark for the training and expertise of 
everyone who purports to be an expert in the origin and cause determination of fires,’ 
NFPA 921 continues to be described in terms of constituting ‘guidelines.’”151 According 
to the Court, “NFPA 921 itself provides that its procedures are not compulsory, expressly 
stating in § 1.3 that ‘[d]eviations from these procedures, however, are not necessarily 
wrong or inferior but need to be justified.’”152 
Finally, with regard to Anstey’s claim that NFPA 921 constituted newly 
discovered evidence in the context of advancements in fire science, the court quickly stated 
“it becomes abundantly clear that periodic amendments to NFPA 921 do not constitute 
newly-discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial in the case at bar.”153 Thus, the 
court held there was no reversible error in the circuit court’s order denying habeas corpus 
relief.154 
III. ANALYSIS 
There are three significant issues that surface from the Anstey case. First, West 
Virginia has turned a blind eye to the applicable standard in Daubert by permitting a 
volunteer fire investigator with questionable credentials to testify about the nature of the 
fire and his findings. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia added 
salt to the wound by explicitly refusing to recognize the application of Daubert/Wilt to 
expert fire investigation. Second, the court’s rationale suggesting the legislature or an 
administrative agency must codify NFPA 921 is nothing more than smoke and mirrors. 
Lastly, the court created an almost impossible hurdle for innocence claims by concluding 
that NFPA 921 consists of periodic amendments not constituting newly discovered 
evidence for purposes of habeas corpus relief. 
Section III.A explores how West Virginia courts have turned a blind eye in 
applying Daubert/Wilt to experts testifying about fire investigation at trial. Section III.B 
argues the legislature’s failure to codify NFPA 921 does not justify the court’s refusal to 
recognize NFPA 921 as the appropriate standard of care. Lastly, Section III.C illustrates 
the hurdle created in Anstey and applied to innocence claims where the underlying 
conviction is arson. 
 
 150  Id. at 876. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. at 876–77. 
 153  Id. at 877. 
 154  Id. at 882. 
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A. West Virginia’s Blind Eye 
At Anstey’s trial in 1995, Begley was permitted to testify about his investigation 
and findings.155 Begley testified about the intensity of the fire in the kitchen and his opinion 
about the origin of the fire.156 Begley’s credentials consisted of a two week, 80-hour course 
on fire investigation.157 Although Begley was not qualified as an expert and his credentials 
were questionable, he gave testimony only an expert is permitted to give under Rule 702 
and Daubert. 
More alarmingly, Begley tampered with the scene in direct violation of his minimal 
training.158 This tampering included switching the breaker positions to off when they 
originally appeared in the tripped position.159 Begley’s conduct tainted the scene and led a 
legitimate fire investigator to believe the breakers linked to the smoke detectors were 
intentionally turned off because the breaker can only be placed in the off position if done 
so intentionally.160 He also tampered with the plunger on the toaster and left it in the down 
position despite his testimony saying he was unsure if it was all the way down.161 Based on 
the placement and condition of the toaster, the legitimate fire investigator concluded the 
toaster was the point of origin.162 Thus, the inexperience and conduct of Begley tainted the 
scene and rendered the findings of any legitimate fire investigators questionable. 
Even though a Daubert challenge should have raised concerns regarding Begley’s 
testimony, the Anstey court noted that “[e]ven today, the admissibility of the State’s expert 
testimony would be assessed under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence as 
evidence based on technical or specialized knowledge—and not under Daubert/Wilt.”163 In 
making such a conclusion, the court intentionally rejected Daubert in arson cases and 
validated what happened in Anstey’s trial. 
As a result of this holding, fire investigators—who would generally be unqualified 
as experts under Daubert—can still testify in arson cases so long as they meet the minimum 
standard of “specialized knowledge.”164 It would seem the court has “back peddled” by 
falling in line with the earlier idea that fire science is more of an “art” than science.165 The 
 
 155  See supra Section II.C.1. 
 156  See supra Section II.C.1. 
 157  See supra Section II.C.1.  
 158  See supra Section II.C.1.  
 159  See supra Section II.C.1.  
 160  See supra Section II.C.1.  
 161  See supra Section II.C.1.  
 162  See supra Section II.C.1.  
 163  Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 881 (W. Va. 2016). 
 164  W. VA. R. EVID. 702. 
 165  Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 554. When NFPA 921 was first introduced, many fire 
investigators sought to counter its scientific methods with a “culture that believed fire investigation was more 
art than science.” Id. at 554.  
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has turned a blind eye by validating Begley’s 
conduct and testimony. This “blind eye” recognizes a lower standard than Daubert for fire 
investigation testimony in arson cases and is seemingly less concerned about the reliability 
of such testimony. This is an issue the courts must resolve because only by holding fire 
investigators to the standard in Daubert, can the progress and reliability of fire science be 
achieved in our criminal justice system. 
B. The Legislative Smoke and Mirror 
As part of its rationale in concluding that Anstey was not denied due process, the 
court stated, “we cannot find, nor do the parties cite, any statute or regulation where the 
State Fire Commission has expressly adopted NFPA 921 as either a compulsory or 
mandatory standard to be followed in fire investigations in this state.”166 The court further 
noted that “the statute pertaining to the State Fire Marshal’s fire investigations does not 
mention NFPA 921.”167 
The court seems to suggest that codification adopting NFPA 921 is necessary 
before being considered an accepted standard for fire investigators. However, this 
argument begs the broader question: Should science be codified by the legislature before 
being recognized as generally accepted? Specifically, should we leave it to the legislature 
to determine the general acceptability of DNA? 
While legislatures certainly regulate DNA and other sciences through the 
enactment of laws,168 the regulation of science remains vastly different from the question 
of general acceptance and recognition of science. The court relies on this “smoke and 
mirror” reasoning in its conclusion, but NFPA 921 debunks the pseudo-science that fire 
investigators originally operated under and, instead, provides the scientific method as a 
means of proper fire investigation.169 
The court should make the determination as to whether science is generally 
accepted within the relevant scientific community for purposes of admissibility.170 In 
utilizing this rationale, the court seems to exercise its gatekeeping function as provided by 
Daubert/Wilt while also simultaneously weakening its role by delegating some authority 
to the legislature. It is not for the legislature to make a finding though as to what science is 
“generally accepted” within the “relevant scientific community.”171 It is the court that must 
 
 166  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 876.  
 167  Id. 
 168  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2018) (DNA testing); 42 U.S.C. § 289g (2018) (fetal research); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 29-3-12(f) (West 2018) (power and duties of State Fire Marshal in Investigations); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 921.241 (West 2018) (fingerprints). 
 169  See generally NFPA 921, supra note 66. 
 170  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 199 
(W. Va. 1993) (adopting Daubert in West Virginia). 
 171  See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94; Wilt, 433 S.E.2d at 203. 
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act as a gatekeeper in determining what scientific testimony should be admissible.172 Thus, 
the court’s rationale suggesting the need for the codification of NFPA 921 is an 
insubstantial justification for refusing NFPA 921 as the appropriate standard of care. 
C. The Hurdle in Arson Related Innocence Claims 
Finally, the court’s last reason in denying Anstey’s claim relies on the marginal 
changes to NFPA 921.173 In Anstey, the court states “periodic amendments to NFPA 921 
do not constitute newly-discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial . . . .”174 Here, 
the court is unwilling to recognize the significant changes of NFPA 921 since 1992 and, 
instead, identifies changes as periodic amendments that do not share a nexus with Anstey’s 
case. 
While there may be some truth to the assertion that the individual amendments to 
NFPA 921 do not share a nexus with Anstey’s case,175 it is still a mischaracterization to 
label the changes to NFPA 921 as periodic amendments that “do not constitute newly-
discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial.”176 The major issue with identifying 
the amendments of NFPA 921 as periodic in nature is that it creates a significant hurdle for 
individuals with innocence claims. 
For instance, consider the initial version of NFPA 921 in 1992.177 The document 
does not caution investigators about the reliance on crazed glass as an indicator of arson.178 
However, the current version of NFPA 921 advises that “[t]he investigator is urged to be 
careful not to make conclusions from glass-breaking morphology alone. Both crazing and 
long, smooth, undulating cracks have been found in adjacent panes.”179 
Consider now a situation where a fire breaks out, and a fire investigator in 1992 
relies on crazed glass as the sole indicator of arson, uses the criticized technique of negative 
corpus in finding the fire was intentional, and a defendant is convicted on the fire 
investigator’s testimony concerning the crazed glass after eliminating all other ignition 
sources. Even though such techniques were widely used before and during the earlier 
 
 172  See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94; Wilt, 433 S.E.2d at 203. 
 173  Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 877 (W. Va. 2016).  
 174  Id. 
 175  Rather than considering the need for a relationship between the individual amendments made over the 
years in NFPA 921, it is important to note that the nexus between NFPA 921 and Anstey’s case is better 
understood as being the overall attitude and acceptance of NFPA 921 as the standard of care when compared 
to today’s modern acceptance of NFPA 921 and its resistance in 1994. 
 176  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 877.  
 177  NFPA 921, supra note 66 (1992).   
 178  Id. (2017). 
 179  Id at 58.  
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versions of NFPA 921, under today’s standards, this would certainly be problematic in 
proving that the fire was indeed arson.180 
Imagine now the defendant in the above hypothetical seeks to challenge his 
conviction after Anstey was decided. While it might seem obvious the amendment to NFPA 
921 is significant, the court has since laid the foundation for prosecutors to argue NFPA 
921 is not a viable means of challenging a conviction in innocence claims. That is, NFPA 
921 was available in 1992 when the hypothetical defendant was convicted, and the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has since recognized amendments like the one 
alleged by the hypothetical defendant are “periodic” and do not warrant a new trial. 
Thus, by labeling amendments to NFPA 921 as “periodic” in nature that do not 
constitute newly discovered evidence, innocence claims involving arson face a greater 
challenge in establishing sufficient grounds for a new trial. The court could have easily 
denied Anstey’s claims due to lacking a nexus with the science in NFPA 921. However, 
by characterizing scientific changes as “periodic” in nature, the court stepped further by 
placing a hurdle on the viability of NFPA 921 in innocence claims.181 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On the day he was set to die, Cameron Todd Willingham’s parents and close 
relatives gathered in the visiting room.182 His mother began to cry upon hearing the 
governor refused to grant a stay of his execution.183 Willingham responded to his mother’s 
tears by telling her “[d]on’t be sad, Momma . . . . In fifty-five minutes, I’m a free man. I’m 
going home to see my kids.”184 Just before receiving the lethal injection, Willingham was 
given the opportunity to speak his last words: 
The only statement I want to make is that I am an innocent man convicted 
of a crime I did not commit. I have been persecuted for twelve years for 
something I did not do. From God’s dust I came and to dust I will return, 
so the Earth shall become my throne.185 
It was almost two years after his execution when the Innocence Project 
commissioned a group of top fire investigators to conduct an independent review of the 
arson evidence in Willingham’s case.186 The group concluded “each and every one” of the 
arson indicators used in his conviction was “scientifically proven to be invalid.”187 In 
 
 180  See id.  
 181  Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 877. 
 182  Trial by Fire, supra note 1. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. 
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response to this conclusion, the State of Texas established its own government commission 
to investigate the allegations of error and misconduct by the trial experts.188 The 
government’s team likewise “concluded that investigators in the Willingham case had no 
scientific basis for claiming that the fire was arson, ignored evidence that contradicted their 
theory, . . . relied on discredited folklore, and failed to eliminate potential accidental or 
alternative causes of the fire.”189 However, the damage was done—Cameron Todd 
Willingham was executed at 6:20 p.m. on February 17, 2004.190 
The tragedy illustrated in Willingham’s story is a reality brought on by the 
ignorance of proper fire science and techniques. Flawed fire investigations misconstrue 
investigative findings, and subsequently lead to the misinterpretation of evidence as 
indicative of the crime of arson. Some courts grappled with the issue of applicable 
standards in fire investigation and sought to “weed out” questionable science and 
techniques.191 However, West Virginia did the opposite in its decision.192 
West Virginia Courts turned a blind eye to the applicable standard by failing to 
recognize NFPA 921 and employ the Daubert factors to determine whether expert 
testimony in arson cases is admissible.193 The argument made by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia hinging its expectation in the legislature to enact a law 
recognizing NFPA 921 is nothing more than smoke and mirrors.194  Moreover, the hurdle 
in innocence claims—involving arson and NFPA 921 as newly discovered evidence—is 
so insurmountable that it classifies progress as “marginal changes” despite actual leaps.195 
In order to correct these pitfalls, West Virginia courts—not the legislature—should act as 
the “gatekeepers” and take corrective measure in arson cases by recognizing NFPA 921 as 
the standard of care, even in the absence of the legislature’s failure to “codify science.”  
Only then can a foundation be laid for the progress and reliability of fire science in West 
Virginia. Until such change, many people, similar to Cameron Todd Willingham and 
Samuel Anstey, run a much too real risk in the face of pure accident—becoming the 
damned in a flashover state. 
 
 
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. 
 191  See Lentini, supra note 18. 
 192  Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 2016).  
 193  See supra Section II.C. 
 194  See supra Section II.C.  
 195  See supra Section III.C. 
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